


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CIA/SAVA /WVIND 726422



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 22 April 1972

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.







For the President Only

~~*Top Secret*~~


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

JANUARY 1972 — APRIL 1972

Weekly data as reported


1968-1972
Weekly average for each month

US BATTLE DEATHS remained the same as last week--12.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

increased from last week's 579 to 815. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE

include three regular, eight special purpose, and two "gap-fill" groups totaling 2,103 personnel. The infiltration estimate for Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 is now some 108,300-110,300.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

rose to 412 from the 219 of last week.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

decreased to 4,890 from last week's 6,584.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces increased to 99% from last week's 96%.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam this week, the enemy's long-anticipated offensive in the Central Highlands got underway as the Communists employed tanks and heavy artillery to capture several South Vietnamese posts in Kontum Province. ARVN units were forced to withdraw from some sparsely populated areas, and are currently regrouping and establishing new defensive lines. Enemy-initiated activity in the rest of the country remained at moderate levels although the enemy has continued to maintain pressure in all Military Regions. The situation at An Loc has improved, but the South Vietnamese have not yet been able to lift the siege of this provincial capital.

On the Plaine des Jarres front in northern Laos, the standoff continues along Skyline Ridge, where the enemy still controls two of the eight major positions. Air strikes have hit enemy supplies and heavy weapons, and enemy vehicles are beginning to bog down on roads deteriorating under the increasing rainfall of the approaching southwest monsoon. Nevertheless, the Communists are still periodically shelling Long Tieng and Skyline Ridge and may try at least one more serious assault before the rains begin in earnest. Elsewhere in Laos, northeast of Luang Prabang a number of friendly positions near an important Communist waterborne supply network were overrun during a coordinated series of attacks on 23 April. In the central Panhandle of south Laos, the situation has remained essentially static, although a few enemy rocket rounds were fired into the town of Seno early in the week. East of Pakse in the lower Panhandle, the remainder of a friendly task force which had been trying to work its way back to the Bolovens Plateau has withdrawn after taking heavy casualties. This leaves only one understrength Lao regular army unit defending the main route from the Plateau to Pakse.

In Cambodia, enemy-initiated activity during the week increased in the east near the South Vietnamese border. After sporadic clashes between government and Communist forces, most of Route 1 from Neak Luong east to the border at South Vietnam is now under some degree of Communist control. When Cambodian Army units being pulled from training in South Vietnam arrive, the government will have almost 30 battalions, along with two South Vietnam battalions at Neak Luong, available for operations along Route 1. There is some evidence, however, that the enemy has also augmented his forces along Route 1 by one regiment. Elsewhere in Cambodia, the Communists continue their harassment tactics in an effort to keep the Cambodian Army on the defensive.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The acceptance of 2,103 personnel during the week brings the estimate of NVA infiltrators destined for Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to some 108,300 - 110,300. This week's estimate takes into account new information which results in a net downward adjustment of some 2,200 for the current infiltration season.

The Communists have intensified their logistic offensive in the Lao Panhandle despite the problems caused by mud and rain since the beginning of April. Trucks have been noted traveling at higher than usual speeds, making longer hauls, and the bases adjacent to Military Region 1 are working day and night. Recent evidence, moreover, suggests they are to continue this increased supply activity for at least several weeks. Orders to stockpile cargo for the "rainy season" and establishment of a new storage complex in Quang Tri Province along with concern about potential health problems which could be caused by the heavy rains foreshadow Communist intentions to continue transportation activity well into the rainy season.

Communist Political Developments

On 25 April, a high Soviet official, K. F. Katushev, left Moscow [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Katushev, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) since 1968, has been fairly clearly identified in recent years as a protege of Brezhnev. He is also the CPSU Secretary who has general supervisory responsibility for CPSU relations with other Bloc Parties. Katushev apparently has been one of the Soviet leaders closely involved with the Vietnam problem in recent months. His visit is almost certainly related in some way to Hanoi's present conduct of the war and he would be a logical emissary to brief the DRV on Dr. Kissinger's recent Moscow visit. He accompanied Soviet President Podgorny on the latter's visit to North Vietnam late in 1971, and as recently as 13 April of this year he held a meeting -- which was announced in the Soviet press -- with the Charge of the North Vietnamese Embassy in Moscow. The fact that Katushev met with the Charge rather than with the Ambassador, incidentally, could mean that the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Moscow himself has recently returned to Hanoi.

~~Top Secret~~